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The Perils of Either/Or 
Katy Hayward (Queen’s University Belfast) 
 
Defining Democracy: Voting procedures in decision-making, elections and governance.  
Peter Emerson. London: Springer (2012, 2nd edn), 192pp. 
 
One of the most striking lessons to be drawn from Defining Democracy is that western culture 
embodies a zero sum mentality: winner takes all. Moreover, it explains how this same culture 
has come to embed a respect for competition (a form of conflict) that pitches individuals and 
groups against each other in all walks of life. In this environment, nuance and complexity is 
shunned in preference for a clear outcome. Emerson claims that the roots of this are found in 
the use of ‘opposites’ in early Greek thought and philosophy, which itself fed into western 
religious tendencies to categorise ‘beliefs as true or false, practices as righteous or evil, and 
choices as between heaven and hell’ (p.4). This embedding of binary choices and binary 
outcomes, he argues, has resulted in a ‘propensity to reduce every complex dispute to a 
dichotomy’ (p.4); all political debates thereby become a matter of choice between us/them and 
either/or.1 In a clever line of reasoning, Emerson shows that this binary thinking explains the 
rationale for western European understanding of what modern democracy should be: after the 
downfall of kings and the collapse of empires,  if ‘minority rule were wrong, its opposite was 
bound to be right’ (p.4). Healthy democracy and political order thus required that the ‘will of 
the people’ is, by definition, the voice of the majority.  
 
There are several negative outcomes arising from this assumption in western notions of 
democracy that Emerson explores. The first is the conceptualisation of the role of elections. 
Emerson claims that there are two key flaws in a majoritarian electoral system: first, the 
assumption that majority opinion may be garnered from majority vote; second, the use of a 
majority vote by those in power in order manipulate the rest, i.e. to corral dissenters/minorities 
into the majority’s view of what is ‘right’.  
 
A second outcome, vis-à-vis governance, is the assumption that western democracy upholds, in 
essence, the right of a majority to overrule a minority as long as it comes after a period of 
debate. Emerson’s contention with the use of debate in majoritarian systems (or versions of the 
same) is twofold. First, during the election (or referendum) campaign, the debate is framed in 
dichotomous language; afterwards, the role of debate in governance is unlikely to evoke any 
significant change because the outcome of it will be measured in zero-sum terms. Thus, the 
problem is not just that the political system is one of winners versus losers; the problem is that 
                                                          
1 This explains the cultural logic behind the process of social categorisation described in Tajfel’s Social Identity 
Theory, which over-emphasises commonalities between group members and understates differences between 
them. In so doing, this process obfuscates the many and varied layers of group membership and degrees of 
‘belonging’ that individuals hold vis-à-vis others. See Henri Tajfel (ed.) (1982) Social Identity and Intergroup 
Relations, Cambridge University Press. 
it gives the winners too much power and the losers too little say (p.101). A meaningful 
alternative, such as deliberative modes of democracy, would generate a wider scope of 
potential outcomes from debate at all stages of the democratic process. One criticism of this 
may be that these ‘alternatives’ overestimate the power of debate to either engage people or to 
make much of a difference to their views. But Emerson’s reply may be that, again, this is a 
consequence of the competitive culture and binary thinking into which we have been socialised 
– if debate and deliberation are to result in progress rather than further entrenchment and 
conflict, people need to be willing to find similarity and common cause. Without such 
measures, most democratic systems will function in full knowledge that the views of the ‘silent 
majority’ (or, as Emerson has it, ‘silenced majority’) sit somewhere in the centre of the binary 
choice presented. Because the elected majority sets the question, the remainder of the 
electorate is limited to either agreeing or disagreeing with its view.  
 
A third, perhaps most damning, consequence of western democracy is the reach of this 
adversarial democratic thought into other parts of the world; the colonial spread of ‘civilisation’ 
has not only overthrown other forms of decision-making but has, Emerson claims, actually 
generated conflict. In the context of many post-colonial states, the construction of a 
‘democratic system’ along the lines modelled by western states (i.e. with political parties 
distinguished from one another by fundamental lines of division, including religious 
denomination) served to make otherwise benign social differences a source of significant 
political difference. The case of Rwanda is a sobering one; Emerson (in an argument not 
unlike Brubaker’s account of the construction of national identities in the former USSR)2 
claims that the genocide there at the end of the twentieth century had its roots not in deep 
tribal enmities but in the institutionalisation of social categories by the Belgian colonial power 
(p.16). Western democracy is assumed to be the alternative to political conflict but Emerson 
goes so far as to say that ‘majority voting is a cause of war’ (p.142). Furthermore, he argues, 
many power-sharing arrangements institutionalise the very sectarianism they were supposed to 
obviate (p.112). Consociationalism, for example, still upholds a dualist conception that 
requires conflict between groups, instead of a pluralist system which requires consensus to be 
found.  
 
Further to this, in revealing the myopia of binary thought in European culture, Emerson 
moves on to reveal the misconstrued basis of many core assumptions about the nature of 
democracy that we ‘westerners’ hold dear. Chief among these, of course, is the view that a one- 
or no-party state is intrinsically anti-democratic. Uganda is one instance, Emerson claims, in 
which the single party system was preferable to one in which multiparty elections can act as a 
conduit for violence. However, Emerson is on more problematic territory here, having 
arguably allowed his objection to the imposition of western norms of democracy to 
overshadow the rights of citizens to engage with the type of activities crucial to debate and 
consensus-finding. On this occasion, the limitations of Emerson’s focus on political 
mechanisms rather than social conditions are evident.  
 
                                                          
2 Rogers Brubaker (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, 
Cambridge University Press. 
This, then, is not just a textbook about democracy and its various forms – it is a thesis and its 
wide-ranging and informative overview of various forms of democratic mechanism is 
conducted in light of this thesis. Yet its value, import and quality is none the less for this; the 
author clearly delights in expounding his thesis and he retains the attention of the reader 
throughout with engaging insights and entertaining asides. One of the elements of this book 
that makes the most impact is its Appendices. The listing, for example, of all referenda which 
have produced results of 49<51% is astounding, as is the list of all parliamentary votes that 
have been won by the power-of-one vote. Such cases beg for counter-factual or ‘what if’ 
speculation. What if, for instance, Frank Maguire MP had not abstained in the vote of 
confidence in Prime Minister Callaghan in 1978, enabling Labour to stay in power and 
delaying the election won by Margaret Thatcher?  From such scenarios to a chronology of 
western democracy, the appendices are informative and thought-provoking and make an 
essential contribution to the book, further demonstrating that the author’s thesis is based on an 
impressively wide historical and geographical scope of knowledge on the topic.  
 
Emerson’s definition of democracy that comes towards the book’s conclusion is explicitly one 
of a consensual and representative rather than adversarial and majoritarian form. These are 
seven theses that are confidently put; from ‘a free and fair, proportional and preferential 
electoral system’ to consensus decision-making and a written constitution, the grounds for his 
analysis have been clearly set out in the preceding text, using wide ranging examples and a 
consistent logic. It is obvious that the purpose of the book is, therefore, not only to ‘define 
democracy’, but to outline its various forms around the world and, in so doing, to demonstrate 
the inadequacy (and, indeed, dangers) of equating democracy with majority rule. In so doing, 
Emerson seeks to challenge not just a mode of governance but also a mode of thought. It is for 
this reason, no doubt, that he has encountered such resistance from so many quarters 
(academics, journalists, politicians themselves) to his quest for an alternative mode of decision-
making (better described here as ‘consensus-finding’), specifically the Borda Count method. 
Emerson seems somewhat surprised, and perhaps a little hurt, that the elites and the voters 
which uphold the status quo in western democracies are still so resistant to his logic. Yet this 
book effectively explains why this is so: we have been socialised to think that any dilution or 
change to the party system risks the creation of a vacuum, instability – in short, an end to 
democracy. Thus, those who seek to challenge the dominant assumptions about – and 
mechanisms of – democracy in western states today will struggle to get their views heard; after 
all, they are in a dissenting minority.  
 
 
 
